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For several decades, the Chinese leadership has used informal bodies called "leading small groups" to advise the Party Politburo on policy and to coordinate implementation of policy decisions made by the Politburo and supervised by the Secretariat. Because these groups deal with sensitive leadership processes, PRC media refer to them very rarely, and almost never publicize lists of their members on a current basis. Even the limited accessible view of these groups and their evolution, however, offers insight into the structure of power and working relationships of the top Party leadership under Hu Jintao.
A listing of the Central Committee "leading groups" (lingdao xiaozu ), or just "small groups" (xiaozu ) , that are directly subordinate to the Party Secretariat and report to the Politburo and its Standing Committee and their members is appended to this article. First created in 1958, these groups are never incorporated into publicly available charts or explanations of Party institutions on a current basis. PRC media occasionally refer to them in the course of reporting on leadership policy processes, and they sometimes mention a leader's membership in one of them. The only instance in the entire post-Mao era in which PRC media listed the current members of any of these groups was on 2003, when the PRC-controlled Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Po publicized a membership list of the Central Committee Taiwan Work Leading Small Group. (Wen Wei Po, 26 December 2003) This has meant that even basic insight into these groups' current roles and their membership requires painstaking compilation of the occasional references to them in PRC media.
In recent years, however, Beijing has lifted the curtain obscuring aspects of leadership policymaking in earlier decades. Compendia of Party documents have made public the 1958 directives establishing the Central Committee leading small groups, and encyclopedias of Party organization have provided authoritative lists of the groups and their members down through the late 1980s. Collections of leader speeches from these earlier periods also refer to these groups and shed light on their functions. These historical sources provide some illumination on the evolution of these groups and offer a basis from which to judge their role in the current leadership's decision-making and policy processes under Hu Jintao.
The Varieties of Small Groups
"Small groups" of various kinds have been used throughout the Chinese political order down to the county level since the founding of the PRC. In the early 1950s, for example, The variety of leading groups in the Chinese political order may be sorted out according to three basic criteria. First, they may be grouped according to the body that appointed them and to which they report. Second, they may be sorted according to whether they are permanent working groups or temporary task forces established to deal with a specific issue. Finally, they may be evaluated according to the political standing of their heads and members.
By these criteria, the most important leading groups in national leadership politics today are the handful of Central Committee leading groups that report directly to the Party Politburo Standing Committee and the Party Secretariat, that have been more or less permanent since their establishment in the late 1950s, and that are normally headed by a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. These "primary leading groups" (as they will hereafter be referred to) and their predecessors are listed in the appended tables.
The Evolution of Primary Central Committee Leading Groups
The primary Central Committee leading groups were first established in 1958 as part of a larger effort to institutionalize the making and implementation of policy under a collective leadership system as the CCP shifted from the main task of creating socialist political and economic order in China ("socialist transformation") to the "general task" of economic modernization ("socialist construction" or "building socialism"). The groups were also set up as a complement to the attempt to create "first and second lines" within the top Party leadership, allowing veteran leaders such as Mao Zedong to retreat to a backbench position while still providing the grand vision of the Party's path ahead and allowing a successor generation of such leaders as Deng Xiaoping to gain experience in managing the day-to-day affairs of the Party.
The first step in these efforts was unveiled at the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956. A Politburo Standing Committee was created under Mao Zedong's leadership and endowed with the authority to make decisions on major policy issues, and the Secretariat was revamped to manage the day-to-day affairs of Party and state. The Politburo Standing Committee included the top leaders of the Party, state, economic, and military hierarchies plus General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, who concurrently presided over the Secretariat, which was staffed with secretaries responsible for specific policy sectors. Under this new leadership system, the broader Politburo met only occasionally. Mao himself emphasized the elements of the new structure in a talk in Shanghai in 1959, stating that "the Politburo is the 'court of political planning,' and authority is concentrated in the Politburo Standing Committee and the Secretariat. As chairman, I am the commander; as general secretary, Deng Xiaoping is deputy commander." 1 Five primary leading groups were established on 10 June 1958 to complement this decision-making and policy-coordinating process. According to the Central Committee notice establishing the groups:
These small groups are the Central Committee's, subordinate to the Politburo and the Secretariat, to whom they directly report. The Politburo provides broad policy orientation, while the Secretariat sees to concrete policy arrangements. There is only one "court of political planning," not two.
2 Among the heads of the five new leading groups, only Chen Yun, director of the Finance and Economy Leading Group, served concurrently on the Politburo Standing Committee. Three others had Politburo positions, and one-Nie Rongzhen, director of the science small group-was a vice-premier.
These institutional arrangements, including the five leading groups, soon fell afoul of the escalating leadership divisions attending the 1958-60 Great Leap Forward and its aftermath. Chen Yun's Finance and Economy Small Group was dissolved in 1959, evidently in the contention over steel targets and other issues, but it was revived in 1962, following the inauguration of an economic recovery program at the 1961 Ninth Plenum. th Party Congress, the Politburo Standing Committee again became the arena of broad policy design, while the restored Secretariat took on day-to-day management of policy affairs. As in the previous era, the broader Politburo met rarely. The single departure from the earlier leadership system was that now, with the abolition of the post of Party chairman at the 12 th Party Congress, the general secretary presided over both the Politburo (and its Standing Committee) and the Secretariat. As in 1956, the system was intended both to serve the need for rational and institutionalized policymaking under a collective leadership oligarchy and to provide in the Secretariat a proving group for a generation of younger leaders on their way to the Party's most senior level. 4 Second, the Party general secretary served only as head of the Politburo and its Standing Committee, and no longer concurrently as head of the Secretariat. Instead, the Secretariat was led by an executive secretary, who also sat on the Politburo Standing Committee.
Third, a new Propaganda and Ideology Leading Group was established-perhaps out of a desire to combat "bourgeois liberalization," and a new Party-Building Leading Group was created, perhaps to step up party reform in conjunction with the 13 th Party Congress mandate for "separating of party and government." In addition, without explanation, the Politics and Law Committee reverted to its pre-1980 status as a leading group.
Finally, and notably, leadership of at least five of the six primary leading groups was concentrated in the hands of Politburo Standing Committee members. Thus, Zhao Ziyang served as head of finance and economy, Li Peng was in charge of foreign affairs (and perhaps Taiwan), Qiao Shi presided over security as head of politics and law, Hu Qili was head of propaganda and ideology, and Song Ping was in charge of partybuilding. The even distribution of these policy sector responsibilities among the Politburo Standing Committee members may have been intended to reinforce the foremost decision-making role of that body and the collective leadership principles by which it was intended to operate. This leadership system in most respects was sustained through the 1989-2002 tenure of Jiang Zemin as general secretary. The only significant modification was that after 1992, the leader responsible for security work as head of the Politics and Law Committee (restored in 1992) was no longer concurrently a Politburo Standing Committee member.
Primary Leading Groups under Hu Jintao
The role of the primary leading groups during Hu Jintao's tenure as general secretary offers insight into the leadership power structure and policy process in three respects. First, presuming that available data are correct, leadership of all of the primary leading groups-now eight, with the creation of the National Security Leading Group in 2000-is again distributed among the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, as the following This practice repairs the slippage that occurred during the Jiang Zemin years. It also comports strongly with the emphasis on collective leadership in the Hu era, during which a deliberate politics of oligarchy has underscored the role of the general secretary as only first among equals-and not as "core" of his leadership generation-and played up the role of the leadership "collective" as a whole. It may also contribute to a more effective explanation for the expansion of the Politburo Standing Committee in 2002 to nine members and the appointment of the same number in 2007.
Second, perusal of the membership lists of the primary leading groups suggestsnot surprisingly-that turnover has become thoroughly regularized to coincide with the increasingly institutionalized succession of top-level Party leaders above the leading groups and the concurrent turnover of leaders of the party and state bureaucracies from which they draw their members. That is to say, the primary leading groups are reshuffled every five years, in step with the changes in the top leadership brought about by the quinquennial Party congress-National People's Congress (NPC) cycle. 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE LEADING SMALL GROUPS
The following tables list the permanent CCP Central Committee leading small groups and their members from their establishment in 1958 to the present. With the exception of names preceded by asterisks, the tables have been compiled from several PRC sources. While these sources for the most part agree, in a few cases they differ with respect to some of the members in some periods. In the absence of an authoritative means to sort out these differences, the tables below include all of the members named in these sources. When available, dates of tenure are included in parentheses.
Listings preceded by a single asterisk are drawn from the online wiki Junzhengshequ (
). This PRC site appears to be maintained by the broader public, rather than the regime, and so the authority of its postings is not clear. Its entries for early periods, however, are accurate and cite some of the same authoritative PRC sources used in compiling these tables. Its listings for later periods may therefore be accurate, but, until confirmed in authoritative regime sources, they should be regarded as tentative.
Listings preceded by a double asterisk are drawn from the successive editions from 1983 through 2007 of China Directory, a comprehensive listing of Chinese officials compiled in Tokyo and not confirmed from PRC sources available to the author. Where China Directory listings overlap with those in PRC sources, they mostly agree, and so China Directory listings not confirmed by PRC sources may be correct. Nevertheless, they do not have the authority of those from PRC sources and are regarded as tentative. The independent China-watching media in Hong Kong also occasionally mention Central Committee leading small groups and their members. Because these references often differ wildly and are of uncertain authority, none of them has been included.
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